Risk in the 1980's: New Perspectives on
Managing Chemical Hazards

CHERYL F. COODLEY*

In recent years, there has been a surge in public concern about
risks to life and health, especially carcinogenic risks, as a result
of technological advances. The federal role in risk management
has grown along with the extent of public concern. In the last decade, the debate aboutfederal risk management and the legislative
proposalsfor change have centered on issues of consistency and
predictability of decision-making. The author reviews the current
federal regulatory framework and then analyzes proposals pending in the Congress for change in federal risk management. The
centralizaauthor concludes that recent legislative proposals for and
use of
coordination
and that
predictability,
not result
in greater consisscientific
fact-finding
wouldagency
tion ofand
tency
scientific advisory panels offer less dramatic, but more realistic,
approaches for improving the management of risk.
INTRODUCTION

The analysis of decision-making, weighing our available choices,
analyzing our goals, and assessing which choice is most likely to lead
is a process we all do, all the time. As individuals,
to the chosen goal,
we assess risks on an ad hoc intuitive basis. As a society, we assess
risks on an institutional basis. Federal regulatory agencies have specific responsibilities for assessing and managing risks in licensing
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new drugs, 1 permitting discharges of air pollutants2 and water pollutants, 3 regulating the transportation of hazardous wastes, 4 and regulating the introduction of new consumer products. 5 The process of
risk assessment applies to decision-making generally, as well as to
regulatory decision-making in the context of substances which may
be hazardous to life, health, or the environment.
Risk management," whether categorized within the rubric of regu1. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1976).
2. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1982).
3. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1980).
4. The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (1976).
5. The Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (1982).
6. The term "risk management" is used in this article to mean the overall process
of evaluating and designing alternative regulatory options and selecting among them,
based on consideration of relevant political, social, economic, and technical information.
The term "risk assessment" means the characterization of potential adverse health
effects of varying exposures. The risk assessment process has been described as four major steps: hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk
characterization. A risk assessment might stop with the first step, hazard identification, if
no adverse effect is found or if an agency elects to take regulatory action without further
analysis, for reasons of policy or statutory mandate.
Of the four steps, hazard identification is the most easily recognized in the actions of
regulatory agencies. It is the process of determining whether there has been exposure to a
condition (cancer, birth defect, etc.). It involves characterizing the nature and strength of
the evidence of causation. Although the question of whether a substance causes cancer or
other adverse health effects is theoretically a yes-no question, there are few chemicals on
which the human data are definitive. Therefore, the question is often restated in terms of
effects in laboratory animals or other test systems, e.g., "Does the agent induce cancer in
test animals?" Positive answers to such questions are typically taken as evidence that an
agent may pose a cancer risk for any exposed humans.
Dose-response assessment is the process of characterizing the relation between the
dose of an agent administered or received and the incidence of an adverse health effect in
exposed populations and estimating the incidence of the effect as a function of human
exposure to the agent. It takes account of intensity of exposure, age, pattern of exposure,
and possibly other variables that might affect response, such as sex, lifestyle, and other
modifying factors. A dose-response assessment usually requires extrapolation from high
to low dose and extrapolation from animals to humans.
Exposure assessment is the process of measuring or estimating the intensity, frequency, and duration of human exposures to an agent currently present in the environment or of estimating hypothetical exposures that might arise from the release of new
chemicals into the environment. In its most complete form, it describes the magnitude,
duration, schedule, and route of exposure; the size, nature, and classes of the human
populations exposed; and the uncertainties in all estimates. Exposure assessment is often
used to identify feasible prospective control options and to predict the effects of available
control technologies on exposure.
Risk characterizationis the process of estimating the incidence of a health effect
under the various conditions of human exposure described in exposure assessment. It is
performed by combining the exposure and dose-response assessments.
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process, National Research Council, Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public
Health, (National Academy Press 1983) [hereinafter cited as Risk Assessment in the
Federal Government].
Both terms are often given more limited and more expansive interpretations. For example, H.R. 4192, discussed infra text accompanying note 94 provides several different
definitions. Title I provides a definition of risk analysis as "the process of quantification,
as much as possible, of the probabilities of an identified risk"; and a definition of risk
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latory reform or seen as a substantive issue in the management of
potentially hazardous substances, is of current and considerable interest in the Congress.7
In recent decades, public concern about risks to human life and
health has surged as a result of technological advances. A 1980 Harris Poll8 indicated that 78% of those polled believed there was more
risk in day-to-day living today than in the past. Fifty-five percent
believed that risks to society from scientific and technological advancement will be even greater in the future.
Several hypotheses have been advanced to explain increased public
concern. Technological advances have resulted in more reliable testing methods, instruments, and procedures. These detect potentially
hazardous substances at lower concentrations. Advances in detection
methods have revealed the extent of the environmental health problem. There has been increasing recognition of the problems associated with smaller exposures over the long term. Simultaneously, the
major historical risks of disease and starvation have been made more
manageable. As a result, attention has turned to reducing risks that
are less immediately obvious.
The federal role in risk management has grown with the extent of
public concern. Through the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the dominant perception was of threat to man from his environment, not from technology. By the decades of the sixties and seventies, a new perception had emerged. Events such as the publication
of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring in 1962, and disasters like the oil
spill in Santa Barbara, California in 1969, forced the nation to examine the hidden costs of technological development. Environmental
concerns prompted the enactment of various statutory measures10
evaluation as "the process of judging and acceptability of various levels of risk to individ-

uals, society, or the environment"; and a definition of risk assessment as "the total process, including both risk analysis and risk evaluation."
Title II provides a definition only of risk analysis, as "the scientific process of evaluating data to identify hazards and related risks, and includes risk characterization and (to
the extent feasible) the quantitative analysis of risks."
7. Risk assessment legislation is discussed in text accompanying notes 29-50.
8. Risk in a Complex Society. A Marsh & McLennan Public Opinion Survey, conducted by Louis Harris and Associates, Inc. (New York 1980).
9. For extensive discussion of the historical evolution of public concerns about risk,
see Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, supra note 6; Public Policy, Science

and Environmental Risk, Brookings Dialogues on Public Policy, Brookings Institution
(Wash., D.C. 1983); Rowe, Governmental Regulation of Societal Risks, 45 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 944 (1977).

10. For example: National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1977);
Poison Prevention Packaging Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1471 (1982); Occupational Safety and
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aimed at assessing and controlling risks to human health and the
environment. Due to the levels of public concern and technical competence, previous regulatory programs had focused on short-term,
immediate risks."' These programs used routine, short-term, acute
animal studies to establish "no-observed-effect" doses and then calculated allowable human exposures. 12 But the legislation of the sixties and seventies began to reflect the introduction of more reliable
testing methods. These resulted in broader government testing regulations, covering more suspect chemicals.
The decade of the seventies was characterized by a search for institutional solutions and by a growing perception of the need to balance risks and understand costs. This led to the establishment of the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)13 and the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 4 in 1970, followed by
the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment in 1972.15 The
most striking feature of this new commitment to assessing and managing risk was a coordinated federal approach.
Simultaneously, Congress perceived the need to accommodate
costs and benefits. The enactment of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)1 6 in 1969, with its far-reaching directives to understand and balance consequences through cost-benefit analysis, evidences that trend. Absolutist, cost-oblivious legislation characterized
the early seventies. In the late seventies Congress made balancing
17
directives more explicit and specified the factors to be weighed.
As we reach the mid-eighties, many landmark environmental protection laws have been enacted.18 Now, when public concern about
Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1975); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 740 (1982); Federal
Railroad Safety Act, 45 U.S.C. § 421 (1972); Lead Based Paint Poisoning Prevention
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4801 (1983), National Cancer Act, 42 U.S.C. § 281 (1982); Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135 (1980); Consumer Product
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1982); Marine Protection, Research and Conservation
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1431 (1974); Ports and Waterways Safety and Health Act, 33 U.S.C. §
1221 (1978); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1980); Marine
Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1401 (1980); Noise Control Act,
42 U.S.C. § 4901 (1983); Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1974); Safe
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1982); Rail Safety Improvement Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 39 (1975); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976); Toxic
Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901 (1982); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (1982).
11. Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, supra note 6, at 9.
12. Id.
13. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. § 1072 (1966-70 Compilation),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 609 (1970).
14. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 553, 651-678

(1975).
15. The Technology Assessment Act of 1972, 2 U.S.C. §§ 471-481 (Supp. v.
1975).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1977).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 39-50.
18. For example: National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.

1018

[VOL. 21: 1015, 1984]

Managing Chemical Hazards
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the risk of cancer is especially acute, and when the result of a particular regulatory decision may affect human life, health, or the environment, the debate about regulatory decision-making centers on implementation of those laws and on the risk management process
generally.

Much of the debate has focused on issues of consistency and predictability of decision-making.19 We rely on our own internal values
to ensure consistency in individual decision-making. In an institutional setting, consistency is sought through various mechanisms,
such as, statutory prescriptions, congressional oversight, agency peer
review, interagency coordination, and judicial review. Recent proposals for change, however, are based on the belief that these mechanisms are not enough-that centralization of risk assessment, with a
different mechanism for receiving and weighing available information, would result in more reasoned decision-making.
Among the risks inherent in substances regulated by the federal
government, no risk is more feared by the public than the risk of
cancer. The ethylene dibromide (EDB) controversy in early 1984,20
and recent disclosures about the EPA's proposal to allow residues of
(1977); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 740 et seq. (1982); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135 et seq. (1980); Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1980); and Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §
2601 et seq. (1982), to name only a few of the most important laws relating to the
environment.
19. For discussion of the problems in the current framework for risk management,
see Risk Acceptability and Management, Report by Congressional Research Service
(CRS) for the House Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology (Nov. 1981);
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, supra note 6; Risk/Benefit Analysis in the
Legislative Process, Summary of a Congress/Science Joint Forum by CRS for the
House Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology and the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space (March 1980); Rodgers, Benefits, Costs and
Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 191 (1980); MeGarity, Substantive and ProceduralDiscretion in Administrative
Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67
GEO. L.J. 729 (1979); Rowe, Governmental Regulation of Societal Risks, 45 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 944 (1977); Kraft, The Use of Risk Analysis in Federal Regulatory
Agencies: An Exploration, 1 STUD. Poiy REV. 666 (1982); Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025 (1983); Regens, Dietz, & Ryecroft, Risk
Assessment in the Policy-Making Process.EnvironmentalHealth and Safety Protection,
43 PuB. AD. REV. (1983).
20. Articles about ethylene dibromide (EDB) headlined the Washington Post, the
New York Times, and many other publications. On October 1, 1983, for example, the
Washington Post announced the banning of EDB as a soil fumigant. By January 11,
1984, the Washington Post had reported that emergency meetings were being held to
map out a strategy for EDB, and that EDB may have "tainted" nearly all of the nation's
7.7 billion bushel grain stockpile. On January 21, 1984, the New York Times lead editorial dealt with the EDB crisis.
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a potentially cancer-causing substance in chicken eggs and meat attests to the extent of the problem.21
This article, while examining and critiquing proposals pending in
the Congress for the way we manage risk generally, focuses particularly on regulation of substances which are potentially carcinogenic
and on the risk of cancer.
In Part I, the article reviews the current federal framework for
regulation of such substances. In Part II, the article explores recent
legislative proposals for centralizing the federal risk assessment role
in a single entity. In Part III, the article critiques these proposals for
change, raising issues of legal and political feasibility. Finally, in
Part IV, alternative ideas are suggested for handling risk management at the federal level.
CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGEMENT OF RISK

The current federal framework for assessing and managing risks
from exposure to substances that may be carcinogenic 22 is complex
and fragmented. There are many actors in the process, each involved
in some aspect of the overall management of risk.
The Congress and the executive branch influence the risk assessment process through legislation and the annual budgetary process.
In its legislative and oversight role, Congress is engaged primarily in
a non-technical review of "scientific facts," often, but not always,
followed by legislative direction to the agencies. In this endeavor,
Congress has several committees which frequently investigate scientific issues.2
The primary vehicle for "in-house" congressional investigation is
the congressional hearing process. Whether used as oversight for authorization of agencies, investigative forums, or preparatory to the
committee mark-up of legislation, hearings have been criticized as
not conducive to the clarification and resolution of scientific disputes. 24 Indeed, because the hearing process takes place in a politically-charg~d setting in which goals are likely to have been defined
21. Washington Post, May 3, 1984.
22. The term "carcinogen" is used to describe any agent that induces or tends to
induce cancer in man or animal, irrespective of mechanism. Public Policy, Science and
Environmental Risk, 45 Brookings Dialogues on Public Policy, Brookings Institution
(Wash., D.C. 1983), quoting from Committee of the Health Council, Ministry of Health
and Environmental Protection, The Evaluation of the Carcinogenicityof Chemical Substances (The Hague: GPO, 1980).
23. The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, and the House Committee on Science and Technology are involved in investi-

gation of current science, technology, and health issues.
24. For discussion of the limitations of the congressional hearing process in the

science setting, see Martin, Proceduresfor Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific Certainty: The Science Court Proposal,16 HARV. J. ON LEois. 443, 468-71 (1979).
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from the outset, hearings rarely provide a backdrop for fine-tuning of
controversial issues. For in-depth analysis, Congress also has available the resources of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 25
the Congressional Research Service (CRS), 26 and the General Accounting Office (GAO) 27 to aid in description and assessment of particular scientific issues.
With the exception of politically explosive issues that may be removed from agency discretion by Congress, 28 the major responsibility for assessing risks and selecting regulatory options falls upon the
agencies. Their discretion is constrained by statutory directives, the
degree of specificity in such legislation, and their own resources and
practices.
Statutory Approaches
The extent to which agencies use a formal process of risk assessment 29 depends, in part, on the legislative authority for regulating
the use of a particular substance in question. Statutory schemes for
allocating the burden of proof affect the nature of the agency risk
assessment process. For example, the EPA administers several laws
requiring substances be proven hazardous before regulation.30 However, they do not authorize the EPA to require industry to provide
risk assessments. But the EPA is also responsible for the administration of laws which allow the EPA to require industry to provide risk
assessments before substances can be used commercially.31 The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) can require manufacturers to perform risk assessments demonstrating the safety and effectiveness of
new drugs, and the safety of additives and other substances ingested
as food.32 But under its regulatory authority for cosmetics, the FDA
has the burden of assessing the risks of a particular substance prior
to regulatory action.33
25.

The Technology Assessment Act of 1972, 2 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. (Supp. v.

1975).
26. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, 2 U.S.C. § 166 (1977).
27. The General Accounting Office Act of 1974, 31 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1983).
28. See discussion of the saccharin controversy, infra note 36.
29. See supra note 6.
30. For example, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 740 (1982); the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1980); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. § 300 (1982); and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6921 (1982).
31. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982).
32. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
33. Id.

Statutory approaches to risk management have been variously catalogued. One useful categorization divides the regulatory scheme for
potential carcinogens into three classes:3 ' statutory schemes which

prohibit any risk; statutory schemes which consider only technological feasibility in regulating risk; and statutory schemes which implic-

itly or explicitly call upon the agencies to balance risks, costs, and
benefits.
No-Risk Standard
The first category, prohibition of any risks, is best exemplified by

the Delaney amendment to the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 5 in
which any indication of carcinogenicity will trigger a specific policy

outcome. The no-risk category is notable for its unintended, as well
as intended, results. Because agencies operating under this statutory

scheme have no discretion to weigh costs and benefits, agency decision-making is mandated by the rigidity of the law. Thus, where the
result would be contrary to popular sentiment, Congress may be
forced to legislatively carve out exceptions to the rule.3 6 Clearly, one

motive for the absolute prohibition in the Delaney amendment is the
perception that food additives and colorings have insufficient countervailing benefits to justify any risk of cancer. Implicitly, in the De-

laney Clause, Congress has made a judgment that the benefits of
requiring zero-risk outweigh the costs in the majority of cases. In

this category of legislative response to potential risk, the risk assessment process plays a limited role. Once the hazard has been identi-

fied as present, the scientific findings trigger the policy outcome.
Technological Feasibility
The second category, consideration of technological feasibility, is

an interesting statement about belief in the powers of technology and
about recognition of its limits. Rather than prescribing a goal per se

(in comparison to the Delaney Clause where the goal is non-carcino34. See Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies for Determining Cancer
Risks from the Environment, 1981; Field, Statutory and Institutional Trends in Government Risk Management: The Emergence of a New Structure, Report prepared for Committee on Risk and Decisionmaking, National Academy of Sciences (unpublished),
adapting and reprinting portions of a table from Trauberman, Comparison of FDA Food
Safety Regulation with Regulation of Other Environmental Hazards, appendix C to
Institute of Medicine, Food Safety Policy, Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1979, and Toxic Substances Program, Environmental Law Institute; Cost Benefit
Analysis and Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation: An Overview of the Agencies and Legislation (paper presented for the Environmental Law Institute, 1980).
35. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (c)(3)(A) (1976).
36. Thus, because testing at the FDA had demonstrated the risk of carcinogenicity
in saccharin, the Delaney Clause mandated removal of the substance from the market.
However, due to public outcry, Congress stepped into the controversy and legislatively
overruled the FDA. Pub. L. No. 96-273.
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genicity in additives), these legislative standards are based on the
capability of technology to control a specific risk. Yet, as with the
first category, the agencies cannot consider cost. Nor can they consider whether use of the best available technology will result in a net
reduction in risk. Standards are promulgated on the basis of the latest scientific and technological knowledge. For example, both the
Clean Water Act3 7 and the Clean Air AcP 8 require that technological factors be given exclusive consideration.
Use of risk assessment in this category of risk statutes is again
constrained. Under this type of statute, an agency's risk analysis can
usually be limited to an investigation of (a) the presence or absence
of a given risk source (hazard-identification) and (b) the range of
practicable and/or available control technologies.
Balancing Factors
A third category, balancing of risks, costs, and benefits, represents
the dominant trend.39 Here the agency's discretion as to what weight
to accord the variables may be quite broad, as in, for example, the
Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA).40 In the CPSA, the legislative directive to the agency is for the promulgation of rules "reasonably necessary" to reduce an "unreasonable risk of injury. ' 4 It is up
to Commission discretion to flesh out the meanings of "reasonable"
and "unreasonable," as well as the meaning of "necessary."
A more explicit balancing statute is the Toxic Substances Control
Act (TSCA). 42 Under TSCA, the EPA is directed to control substances presenting an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the
environment.43 While the EPA is given a range of regulatory options,
it is required first to publish an analysis of its findings regarding the
costs and benefits of the regulatory option and the substance. This
also includes the impact, among other factors, upon small business,
technological innovation, and public health."
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1980).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (1982).
39. See Rodgers, Benefits, Costs and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmen-

tal Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 191 (1980).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 et seq. (1982).
41. Id.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (1982).

43. Id; at § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i).
44. Id.
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(FIFRA)4 5 presents another example of more explicit directives to
balance costs, risks, and benefits. Registration, limitation, or refusal
to register are the primary regulatory options. These options can be
pursued only after a balancing of "unreasonable adverse effects on
the environment" with the economic, social, and environmental costs
46
and benefits of the use of the pesticide in question.
The balancing model, whether explicitly or implicitly enumerating
factors, is the model most dependent upon a full risk assessment process. In order to meet the goals of the statute, agencies may develop
new approaches to risk assessment, but the use of some risk assessment process is unavoidable. The balancing approach requires that a
comparative assessment be made of relevant risks, costs, and benefits. Problems involved in identifying, quantifying, and systematically
comparing such risks, costs, and benefits can be significant.
In practice, most agencies involved in risk management do not institutionally separate the assessment of risks from the evaluation of
various regulatory options. Agencies may use in-house staff or they
may rely on outside consultants and contracts. They may also use
outside peer review, whether through ad hoc or standing advisory
committees. Use of such advisory committees is often directly mandated by statute.47 The degree of coordination among agencies responsible for risk assessment has also varied, depending on Administration encouragement.4
It is difficult to quantify the number of carcinogens present in
commercial use. The regulatory agencies charged with assessing and
managing the substances in common commercial use have a mammoth task. 49 In managing these substances, the agencies conduct an
45. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 135 et seq.

(1980).

46. Id. at, § 136 (bb).
47. For example, the Toxicology Advisory Board, 15 U.S.C. § 1275 (1982); the
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1973); the Color Additive Advisory Committee, 21 U.S.C. § 376(b)(5)(C)(1976); the Technical Electronic
Product Radiation Safety Standards Committee, 42 U.S.C. § 263f(f)(1)(A)(1982); the
Air Quality Advisory Board, 42 U.S.C. § 1857(e)(1978); and the Science Advisory
Board, 42 U.S.C. ] 436]5 (1977), are all mandated by statute.
48. For example, during the Carter Administration, several of the key agencies
cooperated through the mechanism of the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group
(IRLG). During the first year of the Reagan Administration, the IRLG effort was abandoned. But recently, similar interagency coordination is being pursued under the leadership of the EPA.
49. By most calculations, there are some five million known chemicals. Of these,
about 53,500 distinct substances are regulated by the EPA and the FDA. A recent study
by the National Research Council (NRC) has documented just how overwhelming a task
the regulatory agencies have. According to the NRC study, no toxicity information exists
for nearly 80% of the chemicals used in commercial products and processes - substances
listed in the Toxic Substances Control Act inventory. Minimal toxicity information exists
for the remaining 20%. The news is only slightly better for pesticides (complete health
hazard assessments are possible for about 10%). See Toxicity Testing: Strategies to De-
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initial risk assessment"0 as a priority-setting tool. If a substance is
judged to have risks significant enough to warrant action, a more
detailed risk assessment is conducted. The effects of different regulatory options are evaluated. In some cases, regulatory priorities are
refined further. If the agency decides to proceed with regulation,
that process may include agency fact-finding, an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking, a regulatory proposal, public comment and
hearings, a new agency proposal, and final regulation.
In examining the risk assessment approaches of agencies charged
with regulation of potential carcinogens, four agencies provide the
most useful study: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). Their practices illustrate the range of regulatory approaches. These include reliance upon outside scientific peer
review, detail and formality of risk assessments through promulgated
guidelines, extent of inter-agency coordination, and the dominating
influence of the particular legislative scheme.
Agency Practices
Science Advisors
Use of science advisory committees, standing or ad hoc, for peer
review of assessments prepared by the agency staff, or for actual risk
assessments in the first instance, varies among the four agencies. The
EPA and the FDA have the longest history with expert panels.5 1
The majority of the EPA's panels are statutorily mandated, and
therefore have clearly described roles in the agency's risk management responsibilities. For example, the agency-wide Science Advisory Board (SAB), initially created by agency discretion, was formally established in 1978 by statute. 2 It was directed to review the
quality of research and research planning at the EPA and to review
the technical bases of EPA regulatory activities generally. The EPA
uses the SAB in its regulatory process to review staff risk assessments and to address issues with a six month to one year time
termine Needs and Priorities,Steering Committee on Identification of Toxic and Potentially Toxic Chemicals for Consideration by the National Toxicology Program, Board on
Toxicology and Environmental Health Hazards (National Academy Press, March 1984).
50. For a general discussion of agency experience with risk assessment, see Risk
Assessment in the Federal Government, supra note 6.
51. Id.
52. 42 U.S.C. § 4365 (Supp. 1984).
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frame.5 3 The EPA turns to the National Academy of Sciences on
occasion, for studies of issues of less immediate regulatory concern."
The CPSC has had the shortest institutional experience with science advisory panels. The 1978 amendments to the Federal Hazardous Substances Act 55 mandated the creation of a Toxicology Advi-

sory Board.5 6 That Board advises the Commission regarding antidote
and warning label instructions for acutely hazardous chemicals.57 In
addition, the 1981 reauthorization of the CPSC 58 contained a provision that before any regulatory action could be proposed on a substance potentially presenting a carcinogenic, teratogenic, or mutagenic hazard, a chronic hazard advisory panel (CHAP) had to be
established with the cooperation of the National Academy of Sciences to review the toxicity of the substance.5 9 Thus far, a CHAP
has been convened to review the toxicity of asbestos. The Commission has voted to convene two additional CHAPs in the coming
months.60
OSHA has had limited experience with independent science
panels. Until the late 1970's, OSHA relied primarily upon the Department of Health and Human Services' National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) for outside research and
recommendations for occupational health standards.6 1
The FDA's experience with science advisory panels has been as
extensive as, but less structured than, the EPA's. The Bureau of
Drugs within the FDA has several standing advisory committees
which review the safety and performance of all medicines for human
use.62 In contrast, the Bureau of Foods has used science advisory
committees on an as-needed basis, setting up its own ad hoc panel or
relying on peer-review from panels at the National Toxicology
Program. 3

53. Conversation with Dr. Terry Yosie, Director, Science Advisory Board, Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 21, 1983).
54. Id.

55. 15 U.S.C. § 1275 (1982).
56.
57.

Id.
Id.

58. Consumer Product Safety Act Amendments of 1981, P.L. 97-35, § 1201 et
seq., 95 Stat. 703-725 (1981).
59.

Id.

63.

Id.

60. Conversation with Sandra Eberle, Program Manager, Chemical Hazards Program, Consumer Product Safety Commission (Dec. 15, 1983).
61. Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, supra note 6, at 110.
62. Conversation with Dr. Allen Heim, Director, Office of Science Coordination,
Food and Drug Administration (Nov. 29, 1983).
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Guidelines
Agency use of guidelines establishing uniform practices has varied
considerably. Guidelines, of course, vary as to comprehensiveness
and flexibility (i.e., the degree to which guidelines allow one selected
option to be replaced by another as a result of convincing scientific
evidence). They may also vary in their legal status and procedural
implications, depending upon whether they are binding regulations,
established agency procedures, or merely recommendations by staff
or independent peer reviewers.
In 1977, OSHA proposed generic guidelines for carcinogens.6 4 After extensive hearings, the guidelines were formally promulgated as
regulations in 1980.65 However, the agency has not used the regulations as a basis for any published assessment of carcinogenic hazard.
The rules were revised in 1981 as a result of the U.S. Supreme
Court's benzene decision, 6 but have not been republished since then.
The EPA created, in 1976, a Carcinogen Assessment Group 67 to
implement generic and uniform agency guidelines for carcinogens.
These guidelines, while never published as regulations, are fairly
widely accepted. They are quite general in scope and address only
certain aspects of risk assessment.
The CPSC proposed cancer guidelines in 1978,68 but these guidelines were challenged in court6 9 and were held to have been illegally
promulgated due to lack of public input.70
Inter-Agency Coordination
Formal attempts at coordination of agency approaches to risk assessment have occurred over the last decade. 1 In August 1977, the
EPA, the CPSC, OSHA, and the FDA established the Interagency
Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) to coordinate regulatory policy.
In 1979, after an 18-month inter-agency effort, the IRLG pub64. 42 C.F.R. § 54148 (1977).

65. 45 C.F.R. § 50002 (1980).
66.

Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448

U.S. 607 (1980).

67. See Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, supra note 6.
68. Policy and Procedure for Classifying, Evaluating and Regulating Carcinogens
in Consumer Products, 43 C.F.R. § 25658 (1978).
69. Dow Chemical v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 459 F. Supp. 378
(W.D. La. 1978).
70. Id.
71. The efforts of the IRLG, as summarized here, are drawn from a discussion in
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, supra note 6.
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lished a report, Scientific Bases for Identification of Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risk. The report was prepared by personnel of the CPSC, the EPA, the FDA, and OSHA, with the
assistance of senior scientists from the National Cancer Institute and
the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences. It was
published in a scientific journal and in the Federal Register. The
IRLG report was said to represent an inter-agency consensus on the
scientific aspects of carcinogenic risk assessment. It was the most
comprehensive set of guidelines that had been developed for agency
use, addressing most components of hazard identification and doseresponse assessment.
Almost immediately after its publication, the IRLG report was
adopted by the President's Regulatory Council and incorporated as
the scientific basis of the Council's government-wide statement on
regulation of chemical carcinogens. The Council viewed the IRLG
guidelines as a major step in reducing inconsistency, duplication of
effort, and lack of coordination among agencies in carcinogenic risk
assessment. However, in 1980, with the change in Administration,
the IRLG was disbanded. Current sentiment in the Executive branch
favors coordination. The EPA, under the direct mandate of Administrator Ruckleshaus, is now engaged in an effort, reminiscent of the
IRLG, to develop guidelines for assessing carcinogenic risks.
Another inter-agency coordination effort has been underway since
1978 at the National Toxicology Program. The NTP was established
in 1978 as a Department of Health and Human Services effort to
coordinate the Department's toxicity testing programs and to aid in
cooperation efforts among the relevant agencies. The NTP includes
the toxicity testing efforts of the National Cancer Institute, the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, the FDA, and the
Centers for Disease Control. To include the regulatory interests of
other agencies, the NTP relies upon an Executive Committee, which
is made up of the NTP agencies and representatives from the FDA,
OSHA, the CPSC and the EPA. The NTP has reviewed risk assessments, recommended substances for testing, and published lists of
known and suspected carcinogens.
Finally, the Committees of the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS)/National Research Council (NRC) serve frequently as a resource for regulatory agencies. In the last five years, the NRC has
issued approximately 125 reports a year in which risk assessment is
an issue.7 2 In more than 50 of these the NRC Committee has actually estimated or evaluated some element of risk.73 Agencies are free,
72. The Handling of Risk Assessments in National Research Council Reports,
Report to the National Research Council by Committee on Assessment of Risk, (March
1981) at p. 1.
73. Id.
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however, to accept or reject the analyses and conclusions of NAS/
NRC panels.
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE IN RISK MANAGEMENT

The last five years have brought a surge of proposals in the Con-

gress for so-called regulatory reform. 4 Many of these ideas focused
on risk assessment within regulatory decision-making. Legislative

and administrative proposals directed at the generic process of risk

assessment began to surface with the 96th Congress. 5
Some proposals were aimed at studying the internal risk assessment process across the agencies and arrived at recommendations for

change. These proposals were justified due to the agencies' inconsis-

tent and unpredictable use of risk assessment techniques.7 6 For ex-

ample, legislation offered by Representative Ritter (R-Pa.) in the
96th, 97th, and 98th Congresses would establish a coordinated set of

demonstration projects under the direction of the Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP). These projects encourage the use of

comparative risk analysis 77 by a number of federal agencies involved
in health and safety regulation.

8

Ritter's bills were designed, in part, to inform the Congress how
federal agencies are carrying out existing mandates regarding risk.

None of his proposals would affect the content of any existing law.
74. In recent years, these proposals have addressed issues such as establishing a
regulatory budget to control the costs of federal regulation, use of cost-benefit analysis in
rulemaking, sunset provisions, legislative veto, and presidential veto of rulemaking.
75.

See Risk. Assessment, Acceptability and Management, Report by CRS for the

House Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology Subcommittee (Nov. 1981);
Risk/Benefit Analysis in the Legislative Process, Summary of a Congress/Science Joint
Forum by CRS for the House Subcommittee on Science, Research and Technology and
the Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space (March 1980). Proposals
for generic change in risk assessment include H.R. 4939 and H.R. 8303 (Ritter), H.R.
6521, and H.R. 638 (Wampler). Judicial interpretations of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) to include formal cost-benefit analysis make NEPA an early influence in the evolving process of agency use of quantitative risk assessments. See Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F. 2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
76. See 129 CONG. REC. E4052 (Aug. 4, 1983) (Statement of Rep. Ritter).
77. Representative Ritter's bills define comparative risk assessment as: "a procedure in which the assessment of the risks associated with one course of action and the
assessment of the risks associated with an alternative course or courses of action are
compared with each other and with the kinds of risks people normally face in their individual lives." H.R. 4192 Title I. Sec. 104(e).
78. In the latest version of the Ritter proposal, eight agencies are specified: the
Food and Drug Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the Department of Agriculture, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Department of Energy, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Department of Transportation.
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The projects would be conducted in two parts. The first twelvemonth study would be an overview of existing risk assessment procedures, a review of necessary research, and a proposal for the demonstration projects to follow. This segment would be summarized in a
report to Congress twelve months after enactment of the bill. During
the second twelve months the demonstration projects would be conducted and the results made available to experts in the field for critical peer review as well as the public at large. The second segment of
the study would be reported to Congress within thirty months after
the enactment of this act. The final report to Congress would contain
recommendations for improvement of risk assessment, and for
needed research and legislative and organizational change. Comparable legislation was also introduced in the Senate. 9 In the 97th
Congress, the House passed the Ritter bill, but the full Senate did
not act on its legislation.
Proposalsfor Centralization
Other proposals would centralize the risk assessment and, in some
cases, risk management function, in a single entity. Proponents of
centralized risk assessment based their proposals on two features of
the current framework which they believe can be changed: 1) lack of
separation of scientific fact-finding from policy judgments; and 2)
lack of coordination in risk management among the agencies.
Lack of institutional separation of the scientific component of risk
assessment from policy choices is said to be manifested in a number
of ways.80 First, the scientific members of peer-review and science
advisory panels are said to be biased by virtue of their very selection.
It is suggested that members of these panels are selected because of
their expertise, but that such expertise necessarily results in members having preconceived ideas and agendas. Second, the recommendations of science advisory panels are said to be tainted by value
79. In the 97th Congress, Senator Schmitt introduced S. 3006, a companion bill to
H.R. 6159.
80. For analysis of proposals for centralized risk assessment, particularly the Science Court concept, see Martin, Proposed "Science Court", 75 MICH. L. REv. 1058
(April-May 1977); Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managingthe Process,
National Research Council, Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of
Risks to Public Health, National Academy Press (1983); Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically,63 AM. SCIENTIST 509 (1975); Martin, Proceduresfor Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific Certainty: The Science Court Proposal, 16
HARV. J. ON LEGis. 443 (1979); Risk. Assessment, Acceptability and Management, Report by CRS for the House Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Technology (Nov.
1981); Sofaer, The Science Court: Unscientific and Unsound, 9 ENVTL. L. 1 (1978);
Banks, The Science Court Proposalin Retrospect: A LiteratureReview and Case Study,
10 CRITICAL REVIEWS IN ENVTL. CONTROL 95 (1980); The Science Court Experiment:
An Interim Report, Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, 193 Sci. 653; Markey, A Forum for Technocracy: A

Report on the Science Court Proposal, 60
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judgments, both in the generally conservative choice of inference options and because science advisory panel members may develop close
working relationships with decision-makers and thus end up advising
on the final policy aspects of a decision.
Proponents of centralized risk assessment also argue that the
traditional deference paid to findings of independent science advisory
panels further exacerbates the adverse impact of failure to separate
scientific fact-finding from value judgments. Moreover, they believe
the pressure within science advisory panels to reach consensus decisions prevents the public from receiving accurate information about
the scientific issues in dispute.
Lack of a coordinated, consistent, and, above all, predictable regulatory process is a common theme as well. Agency jurisdiction under
particular statutory schemes overlaps,"" and agency jurisdiction over
particular substances overlaps.82 Treatment of the same substance
can vary from agency to agency,83 as differing statutory schemes and
goals are applied. The result, critics charge, is an incomprehensible,
unpredictable hodge-podge of regulation.84
Past and present efforts at coordination among the agencies are
criticized as too limited, or in some cases, too conservative. Critics
also charge that overzealous administrators fuel public concern by
neglecting to emphasize the tentative nature of the scientific findings
leading to policy choices. Finally, critics charge that while science
advisory panels perform a valuable function in bringing independent
peer-review to the regulatory process, the panels lack public accountability and often lack a clear understanding of the limits of their
task.
Proponents of centralized risk assessment believe that centralization would enhance the accuracy of scientific information, limit the
power of scientists, eliminate the opportunity for policymakers to
hide policy decisions behind scientific conclusions, and publicly identify discredited scientific claims.8 5 Their solution is a process that
81. For example, formaldehyde is regulated by the Consumer Product Safety
Commission as insulation under authority of the Consumer Product Safety Act; the Environmental Protection Agency regulates formaldehyde as a chemical under authority of
the Toxic Substances Control Act.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.
85. See Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 AM. SciETIrsT
509 (1975). Markey, A Forum for Technocracy:A Report on the Science Court Proposal, 60 JUDICATURE 364 (1977); The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report,
Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and
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formally separates fact-finding from value judgment. The Task
Force Science Court"6 even relies upon a traditional adversary system to delineate areas of controversy.
Science Court
Presaging legislative proposals for a centralized entity has been
the long-standing debate about establishment of a formal science
court. As proposed by the Presidential Task Force on Anticipated
Advances in Science and Technology, the Science Court concept was
an ambitious and far-reaching idea. It incorporated legal concepts
into a framework for assessing scientific facts. The Task Force proposal envisioned a three-judge panel of impartial scientists. These
judges would hear testimony on both sides of an issue presented by
"case managers," who would be scientific experts chosen by their
peers. At the proceeding, case managers would formulate a series of
statements of scientific fact based on experimental data and inferences drawn from the data. Statements accepted by both sides would
be compiled and published. Statements in controversy would be subjected to a round of mediation.
The remaining challenged statements would be subjected to an adversary process of cross-examination by the opposing case manager
and judges. After a second round of mediation, judges would write
an opinion on the remaining contested statements. They would delineate areas of scientific uncertainty, areas requiring further research,
and areas of agreement. The judges' report would not contain any
policy recommendations.
The proponents of the Science Court concept stressed three key
presumptions:87 1) It is both desirable and possible to separate "scientific facts" from "value judgments," 2) Uncertainties regarding
controverted questions of scientific fact can be resolved through an
adversary process, separating advocate from judge, 3) Disputed scientific issues can best be resolved in a public forum, followed by
written publication.
The goal of the Science Court as proposed by the Task Force was
not to arrive at "truth." Rather, it was to describe the current state
of technical knowledge, to refine areas of uncertainty, and to indicate
Technology, 193 Sci. 653; Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment: Criticisms &
Responses, 33 BULL. ATOM. SciENTISTS 44 (April 1977).
86. The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, 193 Sci.
653.
87. See The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, Task Force of the
Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated 'Advances in Science and Technology, 193
Sci. 653; Kantrowitz, Controlling Techn9logy Democratically,63 AM. SCIENTIST 509
(1975); Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment: Criticisms & Responses, 33 BULL.
ATOM. SCIENTISTS
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areas of needed research to aid regulatory decision-makers.8 8 Legislative proposals for a centralized decision-making entity have paralleled the Task Force proposal in many ways.
National Science Council

Legislation introduced by Representative Wampler in both the
96th and 97th Congresses was aimed at centralizing the risk assessment and risk management function in a National Science Council.
The Council, functioning as a Science Court of sorts, would decide
on questions of scientific fact prior to any agency decision-making.
Wampler envisioned a standing body of fifteen members, housed in
the National Science Board. This body would hold hearings on the
record and decide any question "of scientific fact arising in an
agency adjudication involving the harm any substance may cause to
human health," 89 which was duly referred to the Council. Under the
bill, any party could request referral of scientific issues to the Council. Amendments to seven major regulatory statutes9" to mandate referral to the Council were included in Wampler's bill.
The Council would base its decision on a particular question on
the report of an advisory hearing panel. If the question specifically
involved an "evaluation of risk of harm to human health," 91 the bill
required the panel report to include: a summary of related scientific
test observations with an evaluation of their validity; an analysis of
the quality and quantity of related scientific information available; a
description of groups bearing the greatest risk burden; and an advi92
sory opinion "characterizing the level of risk to human health.
The Council was required to issue a decision, either final or tentative, within ninety days after the date a question of scientific fact
was referred to the Council. The Council's decisions would be binding on the agencies.
The Wampler bill was not acted upon during the 97th Congress.
But, the Wampler bill had closely tracked an industry proposal for
centralization of agency risk assessments. That proposal, in revised
form, surfaced again during the 98th Congress. Since 1979, the industry lobbying group, the American Industrial Health Council
88. Id.
89. H.R. 638, Sec. 5, 97th Cong. (introduced Jan. 5, 1981).

90. Id. at Sec. 18.
91. Id. at Sec. 7(C)(2).
92. Id. at Sec. 7(C)(2)(E).
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(AIHC), had advanced various proposals93 for an expert science
panel, in which independent scientists would be used and risk assessment would be separated from risk management. The AIHC proposal has some interesting wrinkles. Although any party could request
review, only federal agencies or Congress could initiate mandatory
review. Decisions of the AIHC-envisioned panel would not be binding on the agencies. However, failure to follow the recommendations
would have to be explained in written, published form. The AIHC
panel would be housed in the National Academy of Sciences.
Central Board
In the 98th Congress, a bill pending in the House of Representatives embodies many of the presumptions and features of prior "science court" proposals. Originally introduced as two separate bills,
the pending version of H.R. 4192 has two very distinct titles, each
containing a separate bill. Title I, as introduced by Representative
Ritter, restates his past proposals to develop a coordinated, systematic approach to the use of risk assessments through demonstration
projects, coordinated by an agency designated by the President.
Title II, originally introduced by Representative Martin (R-N.C.)
as a separate bill," has a distinctly different flavor. Rather than
study, experiment with, and critique the process of risk assessment,
Title II assumes the need for change and creates it. Title II envisions
the establishment of a Central Board of Risk Assessment, within the
NAS/NRC, comparable to the Wampler Science Council and to the
Task Force Science Court, but more limited. The duties of the Board
would be: 1) to develop, issue, and revise scientific principles and
practices for risk analysis (defined as the process of evaluating data
to identify hazards and risks) reflecting the current state-of-art; and
2) to selectively review risk assessments made by federal agencies or
establish subpanels to carry out that function.
The Board would carry out its review duties whenever: 1) a federal agency proposed to make a regulatory decision or take an action
based on a risk assessment; and 2) such risk assessment was deter93. The American Industrial Health Council was established in 1977 to react to
federal regulatory efforts with regard to carcinogens.
The AIHC has been very active since its inception. On February 24, 1978, the AIHC
recommended alternatives to OSHA's Generic Carcinogen Proposal. On May 5, 1979,
the AIHC submitted draft comments on a report of the IRLG workgroup on work assessment. On September 11, 1978, the AIHC presented its guidelines for evaluation and
use of occupational epidemiologic cancer studies. In October 1979, the AIHC proposed a
detailed framework for federal identification and regulation of carcinoges. In December
1979, the AIHC formed a Science Panel Task Force to develop a formal proposal recommending the establishment of an independent and centralized Science Panel. The Warnpier bill was introduced in February 1980.
94. H.R. 3976.
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mined by the agency to involve scientific issues of national importance; and 3) both the directors of OSTP and the NAS agreed that
it involved scientific issues of national importance.
The Board, presumably acting as an appellate body, would review
the agency analysis and prepare a written report. The report would
not be binding on the agencies. If the agency failed to act in accordance with the Board's report, it would be required to publish in the
FederalRegister a complete explanation and justification for its contrary action.
CRITIQUE OF PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

Proposals for change focus on two approaches: a) study and demonstration projects, followed by recommendations to Congress, e.g.,
Ritter's Title I of H.R. 4192; and b) centralization of the risk assessment function in a single entity, e.g., Martin's Title II of H.R. 4192,
the Task Force Proposal for a Science Court, and the Wampler bills.
The premise of the first approach is the need for further information
on the use of risk assessment by federal agencies. The second approach is based on the belief that centralization is the key to addressing concerns about the current system. Proponents of centralization argue the current federal system for managing risk fails to
separate scientific fact-finding from value judgments, thereby fatally
tainting the results, and the current system is fragmented and redundant, leading to inconsistent and unpredictable decision-making.
Limitations of Risk Assessment
Some of this criticism is misplaced. To some extent, it is not
agency implementation of legislative mandates, incidentally requiring risk assessments, that has caused the problem. Rather, the risk
assessment process itself is inherently limited. The risk assessment
process has been politicized because of the ultimate regulatory outcomes. However, little attention is paid to the techniques, limits, or
appropriate use. Risk assessment can tell us something about approaching risk in an economically-efficient way. It can give us quantitative data on how different risks affect different groups. Risk assessment can also be used to comj~are similar risks to each other.
Risk assessment as a technique leading to decision-making has extremely important limitations. Regarding carcinogens, the data base
currently lacks significant information on toxicity and exposure. This
is partially due to the sheer number of chemicals under federal juris1035

diction. 5 The significance of the lack of a solid data base cannot be
underestimated. The very process of risk assessment depends upon
the availability of exposure data for the substance being regulated.
Without that data, establishment of acceptable levels of risk and
measurement of the benefits of various risk reduction techniques is
difficult, at best. In view of this, the results of a recent National
Research Council study on toxicity testing and exposure information
indicating a paucity of data are particularly alarming. 96
Proponents of centralization, in the form of a Science Court or
Central Board, understand that these approaches cannot solve the
problem of an inadequate data base. But they argue that the
problems of policy decisions tainted by value judgments and lack of
coordination are equally important. However, a centralized risk assessment entity, whether in the form of a Science Court or as a
Board of the National Academy, wouild fail to address these concerns, and would create new issues.
Value-Laden Decisions
Science is not value-free. There are several distinct ways in which
the risk assessment process implicitly includes value judgments in
what appear initially to be scientific decisions. The process of risk
assessment involves choices among alternative inference options.
These options vary in their degree of conservatism. The choice of a
particular option, while appearing to be a technical choice, implicitly
evidences the assessor's judgment about the competence of various
elements of the experiment.
A scientist's choice among alternative inference options is not free
from policy implications. In deciding whether to use data from
animal tests or what significance to attach to it, a scientist may consider the species and gender of the animals used in the experiment's
overall conditions and the characteristics of the results. However, the
weighing of these factors may not be expressed explicitly.
The difficulty of separating fact-finding from value judgment,
therefore, is inherent in the risk assessment process. Even a process
95. As noted supra in footnote 49, by most calculations, there are some five million
known chemicals. Of these, about 53,500 distinct substances are regulated by the EPA
and the FDA.
96. According to the NRC study, no toxicity information exists for nearly 80% of
the chemicals used in commercial products and processes - substances listed in the
Toxic Substances Control Act inventory. Minimal toxicity information exists for the remaining 20%. The news is only slightly better for pesticides (complete health hazard
assessments are possible for about 10%). See Toxicity Testing: Strategies to Determine
Needs and Priorities, Steering Committee on Identification of Toxic and Potentially
Toxic Chemicals for Consideration by the National Toxicology Program, Board on Toxicology and Environmental Health Hazards, National Academy Press (March 1984).
97. An inference option is one of a number of choices for inferring human risk
from data.
1036
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that appears to separate fact-finding from policy judgments will not
change the pervasiveness of value choices within the process of factfinding.
There are other problems with the Science Court and Central
Board concepts of separating facts from values. 98 Substance control
laws are based more on risks from use, production, transportation,
and disposal than the regulation of substances per se. Consequently,
the risk design of regulatory options is intimately related to the risk
assessment process. Indeed, the risk assessment process involves assessing hazards and the varying levels of risk created by different
regulatory options. In this framework, the design of the best option
depends on continual cooperation between risk assessors and experts
on regulatory design and administration.
CoordinationIssues
Another argument advanced for the creation of a Science Court
and Central Board is the lack of coordination that characterizes the
current risk management framework. Critics suggest that the regulatory agencies have reached inconsistent results in evaluating and regulating various substances. Those inconsistent results, it is argued,
lead to disparate treatment of the same chemical. 99
In the majority of cases, the inconsistencies are the result of differing statutory, regulatory, or administrative requirements. The proposals for removing fact-finding from the agencies, and returning to
them fact-finding results for policy decisions, would not change the
differing statutory, regulatory, and administrative requirements.
In fact, the Science Court and Central Board concepts create
more problems than they solve. Many of the problems with these
proposals are process problems. 100 First, in terms of public participa98. Other criticisms of the separation of facts and values include: (1) the notion
that such separation would artificially elevate the importance of facts over the more fundamental policy questions involved; and (2) the notion that in reality, experts don't disagree about objectively verifiable facts, as much as the inferences to be drawn from these
facts.
If the latter assertion is correct, it is an argument for the uniform guideline approach,
as opposed to centralization of fact-finding. See Talbott, "Science Court" A Possible
Way to Obtain Scientific Certainty for Decisions Based on Scientific Fact, 8 ENVTL. L.
827 (1978); Sofaer, The Science Court: Unscientific and Unsound, 9 ENVTL. L. 1 (1978);
Banks, The Science Court Proposalin Retrospect: A LiteratureReview and Case Study,
10 CRITICAL REVIEWS ENVTL. CONTROL 95 (1980).
99. See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.\
100. See Talbott, "Science Court" A Possible Way to Obtain Scientific Certainty
for Decisions Based on Scientific Fact. 8 ENVTL. L. 827 (1978); Martin, Proceduresfor
Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific Certainty: The Science Court Proposal,
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tion, it is unclear how either proposal would enhance the ability of
the public to participate in, be privy to, and influence decision-making. The current process, with some important exceptions, subjects
agencies to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).101 Agency
committees, including science advisory panels, are subject to the access requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA).1 °2 However, the FACA would not apply to the Central
Board under current precedent.10 3 Although the Central Board proposal speaks of input from "public scientific groups," 10 ' it is unclear
how such input would be used. Would dissenting input be considered
and/or published as part of the record? To what extent would dissenting input be invited?
Second, the Central Board proposal fails to address the role of
minority or dissenting opinions among Board members. It is not
clear whether a final review of an agency risk assessment would include differing opinions among Board members, or whether the impetus would be for a consensus opinion. Supposing a dissent was
based on a belief that further research was needed, it is not specified
how the Board or the agency would handle that recommendation.
Third, the failure of either proposal to provide for reconsideration
or judicial review is also troublesome. The Central Board proposal
leaves some doubt as to whether the Board plays an appellate or de
novo role in reviewing the agency's risk assessment. The distinction
between doing and reviewing risk assessments becomes blurred when
a sense of urgency to reach conclusions exists. Creation of the Board
for an appellate function will only delay decision-making.
Fourth, the Central Board proposal fails to address the possibility
an agency may decide not to act. If the proposal is motivated by
concerns for consistency of decision-making and use of the best science free of result-oriented judgments, then a decision not to act
should be referrable to the Central Board as well. The legislation
fails to address this likely possibility. It therefore leaves unanswered
the question of standing to ask for referral resulting from agency
non-action.
Finally, critics of a centralized decision-making entity have raised

16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 443 (1979); Matheny & Williams, Scientific Disputes and Adversary Procedures in Policymaking: An Evaluation of the Science Court. 3 LAw &
PoL'Y Q. 341 (1981); Sofaer, The Science Court: Unscientific and Unsound, 9 ENVTL. L.

1 (1978); Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Science Court (Prepared for AAAS

(January 1977) NTIS Doc. PB 261305).
101. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1980).
102. 5 U.S.C. app. 10(b) (1980).
103. Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1975), arid, 546 F.2d 1043
(D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977).
104. H.R. 4192 Sec. 205(c).
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concerns about the likely impact of the decisions from that body.10 5
Even if decisions of the Central Board or Science Court are not
binding, the implicit authority of such a body would create powerful
presumptions in favor of its findings.1 06 Moreover, it is suggested
that the findings of such an entity could be a powerful influence in
determining research directions and funding priorities. 10 7
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR THE EIGHTIES

Advocates of a centralized decision-makini entity suggest that the

current regulatory framework for managing risk is fatally flawed;
that the only possible means of correcting and improving the system

is by radically altering it. But it is possible that changes within the
existing system would be a more realistic and ultimately efficacious

means of improving agency decision-making. Critics of the system
may be insensitive to existing institutional realities, and oblivious to

the fact that many of their aims are already accomplished under

conventional hard-look doctrine in judicial review,10 and could be

accomplished through other, less extreme, changes.
Much of the dissatisfaction with risk assessment stems from dis-

satisfaction with the regulatory outcome. The centralization proposals are based on the unwarranted assumption that change in regula-

tory process of risk assessment would lead to more pleasing
105. See Talbott, "Science Court" A Possible Way to Obtain Scientific Certainty
for Decisions Based on Scientific Fact, 8 ENVTL. L. 827 (1978); Martin, Proceduresfor
Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific Certainty: The Science Court Proposal,
16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 443 (1979); Matheny & Williams, Scientific Disputes and Adversary Procedures in Policymaking: An Evaluation of the Science Court, 3 LAW &
PoL'Y Q. 341 (1981); Sofaer, The Science Court: Unscientific and Unsound, 9 ENvTL. L.

1 (1978); Proceedings of the Colloquium on the Science Court, (prepared for AAAS
(January 1977) NTIS Doc. PB 261305).

106. See Martin, Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. REv. 1058 (1977);
Banks, The Science Court Proposalin Retrospect: A LiteratureReview and Case Study,

95 (1980).
107. Id.
108. Without any change at all, judicial review also provides a means of scrutinizing agency decisionmaking, and ensuring that agency action is within the bounds of the
statute. The dominant trend in review of regulatory decisionmaking is the "hard-look"
doctrine. The key aspect of the hard-look doctrine is a requirement for reasoned agency
decisionmaking. Agencies are asked to describe their methodology, sources of authority,
value judgments, discarded alternatives, analysis, and the use of analysis in decisionmaking. By taking a hard-look at methodology, possibly mitigated by recognition of the limits
of available knowledge, judicial review appears.to be an underrated means of monitoring
agency action.
10

CRITICAL REVIEWS ENVTL. CONTROL

See Rodgers, Benefits Costs and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 191 (1980); Rodgers, A HardLook at Vermont
Yankee: EnvironmentalLaw Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEO. L. J. 699 (1979).
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regulatory outcomes. But the most important step may be to recognize that science in general, and the risk assessment process in particular, are not value-free. The critical issue is then to ensure that
the agency process provides opportunities for all interested parties to
present their views and that the agency's value judgments be made
in a visible, reportable, and documented manner.
In addition to recognition of the role of judicial review, several
other suggestions for change may be worthy of consideration. Some
observers, working with the current process, have suggested ways of
making science advisory committees and congressional input more
meaningful. 109 In the current process, scientific peer review occurs
after regulatory review and the design of options. The peer review
process could be used at the fact-finding stage of agency action. After the agency has determined its regulatory priorities, the science
panel might make recommendations for needed research. The
agency would develop plans for such research, and the science panels
would review research proposals and the overall research plan. Upon
completion of fact-finding, the panel could examine the data, or the
staff review of the data.
Throughout this process, current concerns about the role and
power of science advisory committees might be addressed. This could
be accomplished by specific task definition, a requirement to disclose
in detail the specific basis on which scientific facts are determined,
and the choice of inference options.
Mediation techniques could be incorporated for the presentation
and discussion of scientific evidence within science advisory panels.
Mediation might be as formal as the presentation of specific differing viewpoints within the committee, and the preparation of a report
detailing these positions, the remaining differences, and areas of
consensus.

To ensure the public accountability and openness of the process,
current exceptions to the Federal Advisory Committee Act 10 could
be reconsidered. FACA generally requires advisory committee meetings be conducted in public. An exception is provided for institutional advisory committees, under contract, to supply advice to the
government. 1 NAS/NRC falls squarely within this exception, and
its committees need not operate under FACA strictures. Yet NAS/
NRC is the preeminent source of advice to the agencies. A second
exception provides for science advisory committees, restricted to providing decision-makers with scientific facts, not policy recommenda109. See Martin, Proceduresfor Decisionmaking Under Conditions of Scientific
Certainty: The Science Court Proposal, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 443 (1979).
110. 5 U.S.C. app. § 1 et seq. (1980).
111. See 5 U.S.C. app. 1 § 10 (1980); Lombardo v. HandIer, 397 F. Supp. 792
(D.D.C. 1975), aj-d, 546 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 431 U.S. 932 (1977).
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tions. 112 To assure public access to deliberation of scientific issues of
interest, the Congress could amend FACA to repeal these
exceptions.
While these proposals arguably might strengthen use of science
advisory committees, other useful proposals for change are directed
at the risk assessment process itself. In December 1980, Congress
appropriated $500,000 to the NAS/NRC to study the institutional
means for risk assessment. In February 1983, the Committee on Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to Public Health of the
NAS/NRC issued its report.113 The report assessed the merits of
separating the analytic functions of developing risk assessments from
the regulatory functions of policymaking; the feasibility of centralization; and the feasibility of developing uniform risk assessment
guidelines for use by all regulatory agencies.
The Committee report concluded the most fundamental problem
in risk assessment was the lack of available data. Proposals for separation and centralization would not improve the knowledge base, nor
lead to the design of better regulatory options. The Committee recommended a three-part program: 1) implementation of procedural
changes to ensure individual assessments routinely take full advantage of the available scientific knowledge, while preserving the diversified approaches to the administration of risk assessment necessary
to accommodate the varied needs of federal regulatory programs; 2)
standardization of analytic procedures among federal programs
through the development and use of uniform inference guidelines;
and 3) creation of a mechanism that will ensure orderly and continuing review and modification of risk assessment procedures as the scientific knowledge base expands. 4
The recommended mechanism was a board of scientists within the
NAS/NRC. Their primary task, as envisioned by the Committee,
would be to develop uniform inference guidelines. The Board would
have no role in reviewing or performing specific risk assessments.
The Committee believed that greater use of guidelines could help
to separate fact-finding from value judgments without artificially bisecting the process. Proponents of uniform guidelines also suggest
that their use would ensure that risk assessors apply judgments in
accord with the current scientific thinking in all the relevant fields,
and ensure consistency and predictability in risk assessments and
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government, supra note 6.
Considered and rejected by the NAS Committee. Id.
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risk management. The Committee believed the use of guidelines
would ease pressures on strained agency resources, by reducing repetitious review in specific cases.
The notion of uniform inference guidelines, while intriguing, has
problems of its own, as the NAS/NRC report itself noted. 115 First,
adoption of a generic approach to chemicals, while creating consistency and predictability may preclude consideration of distinctions
among substances. Blind adherence to guidelines might result in the
rejection of scientific information that was not easily accommodated
in the guideline approach.
Second, it is inevitable that the design and choice of inference
guidelines has policy content. Guidelines would embody both scientific knowledge and policy, by establishing policy for such factors as
dose-response curve and importance of negative findings. Thus, establishment of uniform guidelines will not separate fact-finding from
policy content. It will, in fact, legitimate and expose it to public
scrutiny.
Third, it may not be possible to adopt uniform inference guidelines
for all suspect carcinogens. As current findings suggest, different
substances cause cancer by different routes requiring different
models.
Finally, uniform guidelines, once adopted, may prove difficult to
modify. Some critics of guidelines believe they would freeze scientific
evidence at a particular moment. Institutional caution and inertia
would make guidelines hard to change. It is also unclear what effect
such change might have on prior regulatory decisions based on risk
assessments under the old guidelines.
While these problems are not significant, the uniform guideline
approach is clearly in favor, judging by its past use by the IRLG,
and its presence as a goal of the new, EPA-initiated interagency project. Indeed, the current House bill on risk assessment, H.R. 4192,
includes a role for its Central Board in developing "Scientific criteria." However, in H.R. 4192, the potential role of scientific criteria
appears to be to remove policy discretion from the agencies. In H.R.
4192, agencies are required to explain any variation from the criteria
recommended by the Central Board, thus precluding their use of different options for reasons of policy.
An alternative to specification by NAS/NRC Board of uniform
inference guidelines is worthy of consideration. 1 Instead of requiring the Board to develop guidelines, a more flexible approach would
be to develop a list of specific issues to be addressed by risk assessment. The Board would not specify the choice of extrapolation
115.
116.
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model, only that a model must be chosen, and the choice described
and justified. The agencies could set inference options applicable to
both the nature of the substances for which they have jurisdiction, as
well as to the legislative policy by which the particular agency is
guided.
From an agency point of view, even this approach may be less
desirable than the process already underway. Rather than creating a
Board within the NAS/NRC, a preferable approach would be the
use of standing interagency committees, such as the format of the
IRLG, or the current EPA-led effort. The committee, made up of
the relevant agency heads or their designees, could serve to: 1) develop uniform inference choices; 2) provide a forum for airing important issues as they arise; and 3) develop a coordinated research strategy. If legislatively mandated, such an interagency committee could
be established outside of the auspices of any politically-charged entity such as OSTP. By standing on its own, the committee might
have a better chance of enduring different administrations, which
would be critical to its ability to implement long-term goals.
CONCLUSION

The regulatory process will continue to be the subject of discussion
and the focus of proposals for change. Current proposals for change
focus on the risk assessment process. These proposals, reflecting
older ideas about the desirability of centralizing scientific fact-finding, would remove some agency responsibility for fact-finding, and
place that responsibility in a single entity. These proposals fail to
recognize that their goals of separating fact-finding from value judgments and ensuring consistency, will not be reached by centralizing
risk assessment in a single entity. Centralization would lead to difficult issues of input and review, and an interruption of the critical
interplay between fact-finders and designers of regulatory options.
Centralization would not ultimately remove the value aspect of risk
assessments inherent in the choice of inference options, or insure the
consistency which differing statutory mandates will always preclude.
Calls for reform of our existing system, particularly of the role of
science advisory committees, are worthy of consideration. These are
less dramatic and eye-catching but more attuned to the political realities of a pluralistic system. Suggestions for development of uniform inference guidelines or lists of the characteristics of a thorough
risk assessment are worthy of consideration. They reflect what is already quietly occurring, through agency-initiated efforts at coordina1043

tion. Finally, while judicial review is necessarily limited, the hardlook doctrine continues to provide a means of requiring reasoned and
articulated agency decision-making, and should not be overlooked in
the debate.
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